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Client Selection 
How Lawyers Reflect and Influence Community Values 
LYNN MATHER 
In "The OvenBird's Song," David Engel investigates the relationship between 
law and social change in a rural Midwestern community through an ethno-
graphic study of civil litigation, especially personal injury cases. The evocative 
title of his article refers to Robert Frost's poem "The Oven Bird," in which the 
bird/singer responds to perceived disintegration and decay from change in the 
seasons. The poem is similar, Engel writes, to popular perceptions of personal 
injury claims in Sander County- perceptions that were strongly influenced by 
"social changes as local residents experienced them and by the sense that 
traditional relationships and exchanges in the community were gradually 
disintegrating."' In Chapters 5 and 7 of this book, Marshall and Hans each 
explore ways in which institutionalized legal practices mediate between 
people's perceptions of the law and their engagement with law. In this 
chapter, I focus on lawyers, because lawyers also constitute a crucial set of 
institutional actors connecting culture, community, and law. 
When representing community residents, lawyers articulate their ideas and 
values while simultaneously translating abstract legal concepts, rights, and 
procedures for those who need - or want - to use them. Lawyers thus play a 
significant intermediary role in society. How do they perform this role? The 
most visible way lies in lawyers' advocacy at trial, through public performances 
of attorneys arguing before judges and juries on behalf of their clients. But 
over time, fewer and fewer legal cases in the United States have been resolved 
by adversary trial. Bench and jury trials constituted only 1.1 percent of all 
civil case dispositions in federal courts in 2015,2 and only 4 percent of all civil 
1 David M. Engel, 'The oven bird's song: insiders, outsiders, and personal injuries in an 
American community" Law 6 Society Review, 18 (1984), 551, 556-7. 
• www.uscourts.gov/sites/defaultlfiles/co4man5-o.pdf. 
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cases in state courts in 2013. 3 Since most cases are settled by negotiation 
without trial, a second way to observe lawyers' intermediary role lies in the 
process of case settlement. For example, what is the "going rate" for a guilty 
plea in different kinds of crimes or for settling cases in civil law? Such 
settlements anticipate likely outcomes at trial and are thus bargained "in the 
shadow of the law."4 Plaintiffs' lawyers in Sander County, knowing that local 
judges and juries were hostile to personal injury suits, generally counseled 
their clients against trials and advised them to accept informal negotiated 
settlements instead. 
Yet even before aJtorneys engage in negotiations or argue a case at trial, they 
must agree to represent someone. A lawyer's decision to represent a client or to 
reject someone's claim constitutes a third way in which lawyers mediate 
between communities and the law. Claimants or defendants in civil cases 
proactively seek out legal counsel, but individual lawyers are under no obliga-
tion to represent any particular client. The most common reason suggested for 
rejecting clients is economic: Either clients lack sufficient funds to pay for an 
hourly fee lawyer or else their cases are unlikely to generate sufficient reward 
for a contingency fee lawyer. Unlike criminal cases in which indigent clients 
are legally entitled to a defense lawyer, clients in civil cases in the United 
States have no such constitutional right. I discuss client selection in this 
chapter because, although rarely visible, lawyers' discretionary actions in 
choosing clients are crucial for determining access to the civil legal system. 
Moreover, such decisions illustrate well how attorneys reinforpe community 
values when they embrace certain cases and reject others. We also see 
occasions where lawyers seek to challenge and perhaps change those values 
by representing the claims of"outsiders"- those socially or culturally marginal 
members of the community. 
Engel's study of community and law shows that residents of Sander Country 
disapproved of formal legal action to recover for personal injuries. Instead, 
they believed in individual responsibility and self-sufficiency, seeing accidents 
as just part oflife and not wanting to "cash in" on their misfortune by blaming 
others. Those who did file injury claims were seen as "troublemakers" and 
often were newcomers to the community- migrants, Latinos, union workers, 
and so forth. Lawyers reinforced community perceptions by discouraging 
l Paula Hannaford-Agar, Scott Graves, and Shelley Spacek Miller, ''The Landscape of Civil 
Litigation in State Courts 2015" National Center for State Courts, 20, www.ncsc.org/-/media/ 
Files/PDF/Research/CivilJusticeReport-2015.ashx. 
4 Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, "Bargaining in the shadow of the law: the case of 
divorce," Yale Law Journal, 88 (1979), 950. 
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potential plaintiffs and accepting as clients only those with "real, nonfrivolous 
grievances."5 Unlike the stereotypical plaintiff attorney who zealously pursues 
tort litigation, attorneys in Sander County actively discouraged it. The ques-
tion is: Why? Engel's article suggests three reasons for the lawyers' behavior in 
client selection: lawyers' economic incentives, social networks, and - most 
significant in his analysis- shared cultural values. In what follows I will focus 
on these three, plus a fourth: formal law. Each explanation provides insight 
into how and why lawyers reflect community values when they agree to 
represent certain clients. Yet each answer also suggests why some lawyers 
might challenge or seek to change those traditional community values. For 
example, lawyers who perceive themselves to be outside of a homogeneous 
community might select clients who share their outsider status or whose cases 
could provide an impetus for legal or social change. 
The empirical literature on the legal profession - including client selec-
tion - has grown enormously since 1984, when Engel's article was published. 
Interestingly, Engel's provocative analysis anticipates findings that emerged 
after his path breaking study, such as the importance of cultural over economic 
incentives for lawyers and the lack of any formal law constraining lawyers in 
client selection. I draw on this recent research to explore how lawyers select 
clients not only in personal injury cases but in other civil matters as well. 
I confine my discussion to areas of law with individual (rather than organiza-
tional) clients, given the well-known differences in the legal profession 
between these two hemispheres. 6 
Individuals with claims of personal injury or employment discrimination 
rarely have funds to pay attorneys an hourly fee and thus depend on lawyers in 
contingency fee practices. Lawyers in such practices are quite selective, 
rejecting the majority of clients who contact them.7 Rates of rejection vary 
widely, however, depending on a lawyer's specialization, experience, location, 
case volume, and average case value. 8 Lawyers. paid by hourly fees also 
5 Engel, "The ovenbird's song," 564. 
6 John Heinz and Edward Laumann, Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure of the Bar (Russell 
Sage Foundation and American Bar Foundation, 198l). 
7 Herbert M. Kritzer, Risks, Reputations, and Rewards: Contingency Fee Legal Practice in the 
United States (Stanford University Press, l004), p. 71. 
8 For comparison of research findings in this area, see Table l in Mary Nell Trautner, "How 
social hierarchies within the personal injury bar affect case screening decisions," New York 
School Law Review, 51(loo6-7), 215. Recent research on case selection by employment 
discrimination lawyers reports their accepting only "a very small percentage" (10 percent or 
less) of potential clients: see Amy Myrick, Robert L. Nelson, and Laura Beth Nielsen, "Race 
and representation: racial disparities in representation for employment civil rights plaintiffs," 
New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy, 15 (lou), 705-58, 74l· 
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scrutinize individuals seeking their help in order to be assured of payment and 
to avoid ethical problems such as conflict of interest or malpractice com-
plaints. Divorce lawyers in one study overwhelmingly said that they screened 
potential clients before agreeing to representation. 9 And considerable bar 
commentary warns lawyers to choose their clients carefully since, by avoiding 
difficult clients, attorneys may prevent problems later on in a case. This all 
suggests, as Trautner notes, that the process of client selection may be as 
important for understanding as the rate of client acceptance: "How do lawyers 
think about screening?"'0 The answers below explore the four different per-
spectives on this question - economic, sociological, cultural, and legal - and 
in the end they reinforce Engel's insistence on the powerful role of culture for 
explaining lawyers' behavior. 
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 
Although lawyers perform a public service, they also must earn a living. When 
representing individuals in family matters, torts, real estate, or other civil 
matters, new attorneys quickly learn that hard work and sympathy for clients 
only go so far. They don't pay the rent, the phone bill, or a secretary. The most 
common explanation of how lawyers think about screening centers on eco-
nomic incentives. For contingency fee lawyers (who earn nothing unless the 
client wins), what is the likelihood of their "winning" the case? Cases most 
likely to be accepted should have legal merit and high damages. Kritzer's 
survey of contingency fee lawyers, for example, found that "lack ofliability and 
inadequate damages (together or singly) are the dominant reasons for declin-
ing cases, accounting for about 8o percent."" Other researchers, such as 
Trautner, have found tort lawyers' perceptions of potential damages to be 
even more important than liability in the decision to accept or reject a case." 
Stratification in the plaintiffs' bar produces varying rates of client accept-
ance due to differences in the lawyers' practices. While many lawyers handle 
auto accidents or slip-and-fall cases, a smaller group specializes in cases invol-
ving more severe injuries or greater complexity (such as medical malpractice). 
Daniels and Martin distinguish between "bread and butter" plaintiff lawyers 
and "heavy hitters" according to the average value of their typical cases, and 
9 Lynn Mather, Craig A. McEwen, and Richard J. Maiman, Divorce Lawyers at Work: Varieties 
of Professionalism in Practice (Oxford University Press, 1.001), p. 93· 
10 Trautner, "Social hierarchies," 240. 11 Kritzer, Risks, Reputations, and Rewards, p. 84. 
" Mary Nell Trautner, "Tort reform and access to justice: how legal environments shape 
lawyers' case selection," Qualitative Sociology, 34 (:~.ou), 523-38, 530; see also Myrick et a!., 
"Race and representation," 747· 
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find the latter to be more selective in choosing clients.'3 High-end lawyers 
scrutinize potential cases for reassurance that the damages recovered will 
justify the time they invest. Kritzer, on the other hand, finds that high-volume 
attorneys reject proportionately more clients than low-volume attorneys do, 
perhaps because of the different referral patterns. 14 Lawyers handling a large 
number of cases often rely on mass advertising or client referral for their 
contacts, while those with fewer cases depend on attorney referrals, which 
means that some lawyer screening has already occurred. Each of these various 
personal injury practices rests on its own pattern of risks and rewards.'5 
Hourly fee lawyers also balance risk and reward in client selection. The risks 
for these attorneys involve investing more time than the client will be able to 
pay for, not getting paid at the end of a case, taking on too many cases and 
consequently neglecting some, or being pushed by a client to engage in 
ethical misconduct. Research on the divorce bar in New England conducted 
by myself and two co-authors reveals how some lawyers charge low fees and 
attract a large number of lower-income clients, others charge more per hour 
and require a modest retainer up front, and high-end divorce attorneys 
demand a large retainer and charge high fees.'6 We found that the average 
number of hours lawyers invested in a case, the nature of advocacy, and the 
length of the divorce process were associated with these different business 
models of divorce practice. That is, "having clients with few financial assets 
prompts attorneys to limit sharply what they do in the average case, while 
having clients with deeper pockets encourages expansion of billable hours and 
increased use of the formal legal process."'7 
Economic incentives in client selection are also shown in Michelson's 
study of Chinese lawyers at work. He finds that lawyers' financial insecurity 
and the conditions of solo legal practice in Beijing lead to their frequent 
rejection of cases with low fee potential. '8 As noted earlier, the legal merit 
of a case matters in client selection because it could produce a good finan-
cial outcome for both the lawyer and the client. But as Michelson notes, 
"the boundaries of 'legal merit' are flexible and malleable," reflecting and 
'3 Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin, "It was the best of times, it was the worst of times: the 
precarious nature of plaintiffs practice in Texas," Texas Law Review, 8o (2.oo2.), 1781-82.8, 1789; 
see also Trautner, "Social hierarchies," and Sara Parikh, "How the spider catches the fly: 
referral networks in the plaintiffs' personal injury bar," New York Law School Law Review, 51 
(2.006-7 ), 243-83-
'4 Kritzer, Risks, Reputations, and Rewards, pp. 71-2.. '5 See ibid for this phrase. 
'
6 Mather et al., Divorce Lawyers at Work. '7 Ibid, p. 142· 
'
8 Ethan Michelson, "The practice of law as an obstacle to justice: Chinese lawyers at work," 
Law 6 Society Review, 40 (:~.oo6), 1-38. 
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reproducing cultural stereotypes.'9 Chinese lawyers' aversion to clients with 
labor disputes (compared to clients with housing or commercial conflicts) 
underscores Michelson's point. Client characteristics such as attractiveness, 
credibility, or "likeability"20 also influence lawyers in client selection, in part 
because of how such characteristics might influence a judge or jury. As Engel 
explains in "The OvenBird's Song," personal injury lawyers evaluate potential 
clients and negotiate case settlements using their "shared knowledge of the 
likely juror reaction if the case actually went to trial."21 Trautner's research 
comparing client selection in states with tort reform and those without reform 
strongly supports this argument, showing how "lawyers frame cases in ways 
they expect to appeal to what they believe the jury will find compelling in the 
context of their own localized legal cultures."22 Hence, even· when attorneys 
are thinking about their own self-interest - if and how they will be paid - they 
are reflecting community values in their predictions about case outcomes. 
Attorneys (especially those in solo practice) have considerable autonomy in 
setting fees, so they can adjust them downward for sympathetic individuals or 
upward to deter to difficult ones. The category of the "difficult" client emerges 
frequently in studies of client selection. When divorce lawyers in New Eng-
land were asked to describe which clients they rejected, about half said those 
who are "difficult," variously defined as "vengeful, unrealistic, stubborn, or 
demanding"; "those who won't listen to you"; and "cli.ents I'm not comfort-
able with."'3 Lawyers in Beijing said they rejected clients "who are unreason-
ably demanding," "who try to direct my work," or "who won't stop pestering 
me."24 Personal injury lawye;s interviewed by Kritzer said they sometimes 
hesitated to represent "high-maintenance" clients or those who engaged in 
lawyer shopping.'5 And employment discrimination lawyers considered the 
plaintiffs demeanor when deciding on representation; one lawyer interviewed 
"said he had a 'sixth sense' for 'difficult' clients, meaning that they would 
become 'accusatory' or 'whin[y] in the course of the lawyer-client relation-
ship."'6 Since lawyers hesitate to turn away business- even that of difficult or 
"whiny" clients - they sometimes charge a higher hourly fee or increase the 
size of their retainer to compensate for the difficulty anticipated in represen-
tation. As one divorce lawyer said, "I don't mind a pain if they are going to 
'
9 Ibid, 5· "" Trautner, "Tort reform." "' Eng.el, "The oven bird's song," 564-5. 
" Mary Nell Trautner, "Personal responsibility v. corporate liability: how personal injury lawyers 
screen cases in an era of tort reform," Sociology of Crime, Law and Deviance, 12. (2.009), 2.03-30, 
at 2.2.7. 
'l Mather et al., Divorce Lawyers at Work, pp. 93-4- "~ Michelson, 'The practice oflaw," 2.0. 
'
5 Kritzer, Risks, Reputations, and Rewards, p. 86. 
'
6 Myrick et al., "Race and representation," 744· 
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pay mel"2 7 Similarly, Michelson reports that some Chinese lawyers would 
tolerate the "risk and the annoyances associated with 'difficult' clients if the fee 
potential of the case [was) sufficiently attractive.'"8 
A small number of divorce lawyers in New England took this rational 
calculation even further to carve out a market niche for themselves - one 
that appealed directly to vengeful or unreasonable clients and offered to act as 
a hired gun for them. Unlike most divorce lawyers, who invoked the norms of 
reasonableness of their legal communities, these attorneys rejected cooper-
ation and instead embraced a more aggressive "Rambo"-style representation. 
They knew they could attract clients this way, especially those stubborn or 
angry clients who were unwilling to listen to attorneys' pleas to be patient and 
realistic about their divorce.29 
By pursuing their economic self-interest when selecting clients, lawyers thus 
reflected community values by predicting jurors' responses to those clients, or 
by aiding clients in resolving their conflicts in cooperative or adversarial ways 
depending on the interests of the individuals - and the lawyers. 
SOCIAL NETWORKS AND RELATIONSHIPS 
The fact that lawyers practice within social networks offers a second explan-
ation for how they select their clients. Lawyers' ongoing interactions and close 
relationships in a community profoundly shape the way in which they do their 
work. In "The Oven Bird's Song," Engel explains the local bar's disinterest 
in filing personal injury claims as due in part to the social network of profes-
sional practice: "Sander County lawyers were seen as closely linked to the 
kinds of individuals and businesses against whom tort actions were typically 
brought."30 That is, since lawyers are embedded in a social hierarchy, they are 
reluctant to accept clients wanting to sue those whom the lawyers generally 
represent. Indeed, Engel's data from a sample of civil cases confirms this 
point: Only 12.5 percent of the plaintiffs in tort cases were represented by 
attorneys from Sander County, in contrast to 72.5 percent of the non-tort 
plaintiffs who had legal counsel from the county.3' Thus, local lawyers did not 
hesitate to represent plaintiffs in other areas of law - it was only the tort cases 
that they avoided. Consequently, Sander County residents who sought legal 
help for personal injury claims were often represented by one particular lawyer 
'7 Mather et al., Divorce Lawyers at Work, p. 95· ,a Michelson, "The practice of law," 21. 
'9 Mather et al., Divorce Lawyers at Work, pp. 85-6. 30 Engel, "The oven bird's song," 565. 
3' Ibid. 
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who lived just over the county line, a lawyer who readily admitted to Engel: 
''I'm not part of the establishment."3~ 
This lawyer's comment underscores two different aspects of a lawyer's social 
network. Not only do ongoing relationships constrain lawyers in their work; 
so also does the hierarchy of the legal community. Van Hoy's research on 
Indiana lawyers, Parikh's on the Chicago bar, and Daniels and Martin's on the 
Texas bar reveal a great deal about the role of hierarchy among personal injury 
lawyers. 33 Each finds substantial stratification shaped by geographic reach, 
type and volume of cases, and specialization. Parikh notes that this hierarchy is 
"less obvious to outsiders," although well known within the bar.34 Ranging 
from attorneys with a small number of high-value, complex cases to those 
handling many routine auto accidents, the bar depends heavily on cooper-
ation for referrals. High-end practitioners refer low-value cases down the 
hierarchy and low-end practitioners return the favor (since the latter lack 
the resources to handle a specialized case and also could not shoulder that 
degree of risk). Additional referral partners come from small firms representing 
individuals on matters outside of personal injury. Parikh finds that the ties 
among referral partners are long-lasting, involve frequent contact, and are 
personal (rather than firm-based). These embedded ties among personal 
injury lawyers, Parikh suggests, not only shape the clientele that each repre-
sents, but also reproduce the stratification and hierarchy of the profession as 
a whole.35 
Throughout the United States, 63 percent of private practitioners work 
either as solo practitioners or in small firms of one to five lawyers. 36 That 
does not mean, however, that these individuals are working entirely on their 
own, unconstrained in selecting clients or deciding how to represent them. 
Networks of attorneys, stemming in part from market considerations but also 
from ongoing social and professional interactions, create informal norms, 
mutual dependencies, and common standards. These "communities of prac-
tice," as my co-authors and I call them, include groups of lawyers practi-
cing in a particular locality and those within a specific legal field such as 
personal injury or divorce.37 Our research on divorce lawyers in Maine and 
p Ibid, 566. 
33 Jerry Van Hoy, "Markets and contingency: how client markets influence the work of plaintiffs' 
personal injury lawyers," International Journal of the Legal Profession, 6 (1999), 345-66; 
Parikh, "How the spider catches the fly"; Daniels and Martin, "Best of times." 
14 Parikh, "How the spider catches the fly," 247· 35 Ibid, 267. 
l6 www.americanbar.org/contentldam/aba/administrative/market_research/lawyer-demographics-
tables-2ol6.authcheckdam.pd£ 
37 Mather et a!., Divorce Lawyers at Work, p. 6. 
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New Hampshire, for example, describes a hierarchy among divorce practition-
ers quite similar to the personal injury bar: High-end attorneys often face each 
other in two-lawyer divorce cases involving considerable assets, while divorce 
attorneys with working-class clients rarely face a lawyer on the other side and 
seek to finalize divorces as quickly and efficiently as possible. We also found 
among most of the divorce lawyers whom we interviewed a generally shared 
commitment to being reasonable, sharing information when asked, seeking 
to settle cases amicably, and avoiding unnecessary litigation. As noted in the 
previous section, however, a few lawyers in each locality rejected this norm of 
the reasonable lawyer and sought to carve out a market niche of their own, in 
some ways acting similarly to the lawyer in Sander County who said he wasn't 
part of the establishment. 
Research on legal practice in small towns and rural areas shows how 
pervasive and influential these social networks can be. In small, tightly knit 
communities with ongoing social relationships, lawyers advocate for clients 
within the confines of those networks. Landon's study of lawyers in rural 
Missouri shows how lawyers redefined advocacy to avoid excessive zeal, 
cooperating with other attorneys and tamping down any client expectations 
of adversarial conflict in ;rder to preserve the social fabric.38 Recent research 
by Li on case screening in rural China points to a similar phenomenon - i.e., 
"relational embeddedness," referring to "concrete and durable relationships 
among law practitioners, clients, adversaries, and the communities these 
individuals inhabit."39 Li's fieldwork in Chinese law offices finds that eco-
nomic incentives explain some of their decisions on client selection, but 
she argues that economics was not the overriding determinant. Indeed, this 
2016 study provides considerable evidence showing that "when faced with 
social obligations derived from kinship, friendship, and community member-
ship, legal workers often put monetary interests on the back burner.''40 Some 
of the crucial non-monetary incentives that influenced client selection 
include the exchange of favors, the need to uphold moral obligations and 
show respect, and a desire to avoid social fallout. 
Although research on relational embeddedness typically emphasizes its 
positive benefits for communities, Li draws on her research to point out 
its negative aspects, namely legal workers' tendency to support the more 
38 Donald D. Landon, Country Lawyers: The Impact of Context on Professional Practice 
(Praeger, 1990 ). 
39 Ke Li, "Relational embeddedness and socially motivated case screening in the practice of 
law in rural China," Law 6 Society Review, 50 (2.016), 92o-52, 921. 
40 Ibid, 935· 
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powerful party in disputes and thereby reinforce existing social inequalities. 
By agreeing to represent some clients and reject others, and to give priority to 
certain types of cases, law practitioners in rural China - like the lawyers in 
Sander County who would not represent personal injury clients - reinforce 
dominant community values. 
SHARED CULTURAL AND PERSONAL VALUES 
In his discussion of lawyers and local values, Engel emphasizes that many of 
the lawyers he interviewed "were born and raised in the area" and thus "shared 
the local tendency to censure those who aggressively asserted personal injury 
claims."4' Just like the insurance adjusters who downgraded injury claims and 
the jurors and judges who disapproved of. tort cases, lawyers in Sander County 
grew up in the community and shared its ideas and beliefs. That is to say, even 
the few attorneys who agreed to represent plaintiffs in injury cases had intern-
alized the community's hostile view of these claims. 
In the traditional bar account of lawyers' choices about client representation 
or advocacy, lawyers' personal values have no bearing on their professional 
conduct. Instead, the norms of the profession and professional socialization 
have ostensibly "bleached out" attorneys' personal attributes, based on race, 
gender, religion, or social background.42 But the indeterminacy of law and the 
wide discretion enjoyed by attorneys provide considerable space for lawyers' 
own personal identities and values to affect their professional decisions. 
Implicit biases regarding race, religion, or gender also influence lawyers' 
judgment. Further, the fact that others (judges, opposing lawyers, clients, 
witnesses, etc.) consciously or unconsciously treat lawyers according to their 
gender or race may lead - or even in some way oblige -women and minority 
attorneys to reflect their own personal identities in their professional work.43 
When seeking an attorney, potential litigants often look for someone with 
certain personal attributes in addition to the requisite professional qualities. 
Representation by an attorney of the same gender, race, or ethnicity can 
promote trust, and some clients believe it may improve the lawyer-client 
4' Engel, "The ovenbird's song," 565. 
42 Levinson coined the term "bleached out professionalism" to describe the belief that lawyers' 
personal characteristics have no bearing on their professional values or conduct. He then 
critiques that view for Jewish lawyers in various situations. See Sanford Levinson, "Identifying 
the Jewish lawyer: reflections on the construction of professional identity," Cardozo Law 
Review, 14 (1993), 1577-1612, 1578. 
43 See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, "Identities and roles: race, recognition, and professional 
responsibility," Maryland Law Review, 57 (1998), 150::1; and Mather et al., :~oo1. 
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relationship. Thus, regardless of how gender or race-blind the attorney is, or 
aspires to be, client perceptions and expectations may affect their relationship. 
At the same time, implicit or explicit biases can influence lawyers' responses 
to those seeking their services. A large study of employment discrimination 
claims in federal court found that Mrican-Americans are almost twice as 
likely as whites to lack legal representation. Part of this may be due to Black 
plaintiffs' lack of trust in the legal profession (given that nearly all specialist 
lawyers are white), but part might also be explained by lawyers' implicit 
biases -their perceptions of Black clients as being more difficult, less credible, 
or harder to work with.44 
Women divorce lawyers report that potential clients often contact them 
because of their gender. Some wives say they feel more comfortable talking to 
a woman lawyer, while others believe that a woman will better understand 
their problems and fight harder for them. And some women divorce lawyers 
admit they prefer to represent wives. Checking the docket records of over 
6,ooo divorce cases in New England, my colleagues and I found that female 
attorneys disproportionately represent wives in divorce cases.45 Some women 
divorce lawyers we interviewed described their enjoyment of divorce work due 
to the intimacy and close emotional bond they could forge with a largely 
female clientele. Women attorneys are also more likely than men to specialize 
in divorce, and one specialist, for example, extolled the perfect match between 
her personal values and divorce law: "It was just a very good fit because I love 
people, and I've always been very interested in human relations, so it's a just 
a natural."46 
Research on immigration lawyers reveals the importance of national and 
ethnic background for this area of practice. Levin's survey of immigration 
lawyers in New York City found that one-third were immigrants themselves, 
while the same proportion were born in the US and had at least one parent 
who was foreign-born. 47 Although these attorneys had many different reasons 
for initially entering the immigration field, they continued to represent immi-
grants because this area of practice "resonated with their own history or 
because of a desire to help others" - especially others like themselves.48 
Historically, religious identity directly affected lawyers' selection of clients 
and areas of practice, as Jews and Catholics were barred from elite law firms 
for much of the twentieth century. Consequently, these attorneys gravitated 
44 Myrick eta!., "Race and representation," 720. 
45 Mather eta!., Divorce Lawyers at Work, pp. 56 and 2o8 (fn 16). 46 Ibid, 157. 
47 Leslie C. Levin, "Guardians at the gate: the backgrounds, career paths, and professional 
development of private US immigration lawyers," Law 6 Social Inquiry, 34 (2009), 399· 
48 Ibid, 411. 
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to personal plight fields of law, representing individuals in criminal cases, 
personal injuries, or family matters, and contributing to the social stratification 
of the legal profession still noted today.49 Lawyers' religious beliefs may affect 
the selection of individual clients through the particular values of their 
practice, as, for instance, when Jewish lawyers work for social justice or serve 
the poor as part of their religious faith, so or when Catholic lawyers integrate 
moral analysis with their legal counselingY But religious values can exert an 
even stronger influence on attorneys through legal obligation- for example, to 
canon or Jewish law. During the 1950s, for instance, Catholic lawyers were 
forbidden by Church doctrine from representing clients in a divorce action 
without prior approval from their local bishop and any lawyer ignoring this 
command would be committing "a seriously sinful act."52 Similarly, some 
rabbis have ruled that Jewish lawyers should not represent clients as plaintiffs 
unless they have first sought to resolve their conflicts in a rabbinical court.53 
Levinson notes, however, that the question of the Catholic or Jewish lawyer "is 
not precisely analogous to questions involving other attributes like gender, 
race, or ethnicity," since the latter may suggest "distinctive way of looking 
at the world" whereas the former may in fact involve a matter of competing 
legal obligation. 54 
Increased diversity in the contemporary legal profession and changing 
expectations of the lawyer-client relationship pose challenges for a distinct 
professional identity. For instance, Mah argues that new Latino and Asian-
American immigrant communities have social norms and worldviews that are 
poorly served by the bar, not because of too few Latino and Asian lawyers but 
because of professional norms such as client autonomy and lawyer neutrality, 
which clash with the norms of these immigrant communities. 55 Similarly, a 
detailed analysis of American Indian tribal litigation by Carpenter and Wald 
underscores the obstacles confronting tribal attorneys when representing their 
tribes because of professional bar rules that are not well suited for group 
lawyering.56 These scholars see great advantage in allowing lawyers to have 
"thick" professional identities - closely identifying with their clients - but 
49 John P. Heinz et al., Urban Lawyers: The New Social Structure of the Bar (University of 
Chicago Press, 2005). 
5o Russell G. Pearce, "The Jewish lawyer's question," Texas Tech Law Review, 27 (1996), 1:1.59. 
5' Thomas L. Shaffer, On Being a Christian and a Lawyer (Brigham University Press, 1981). 
5' Albert L. Schlitzer, "Catholic lawyer and divorce cases," Notre Dame Law Review, 29 
(1953). 37· 44· 
53 Levinson, "Identifying the Jewish lawyer," 1603. 54 Ibid, 1611. 
55 Liwan Mah, "The legal profession faces new faces: how lawyers' professional norms should 
change to serve a changing American population," California Law Review, 93 (2005), 1Tl.l. 
56 Kristen A. Carpenter and Eli W~ld, "Lawyering for groups: the case of American Indian tribal 
attorneys," Fordham Law Review, 81 (2013), 3085. 
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others, such as Spaulding, view such intense identification as "self-interested 
perversion" of the professional norm of service. 57 
These last points have special resonance in light of Engel's exploration 
of law and social change in Sander County. When social outsiders in that 
community - newcomers or those with a different ethnic or religious back-
ground -were injured in accidents, they struggled to find help from the local 
lawyers. But lawyers located outside of the county were willing to represent 
the injured claimants and to fight in court on their behalf. Being outsiders 
themselves, these attorneys were less likely to share the cultural values of 
Sander County. 
FORMAL LAW 
Interestingly, as Konefsky notes in his chapter about "The OvenBird's Song," 
formal law plays little or no role in explaining civil litigation in Sander 
County. Cultural, social, and economic influences loom much larger in 
Engel's analysis, both for understanding who uses the court to recover for 
injuries and for showing how lawyers decide which injury plaintiffs to accept 
or reject. Indeed, the broader question of how lawyers think about client 
selection in civil cases is also surprisingly unconstrained by law. Historically, 
lawyers in the US have enjoyed nearly complete professional autonomy to 
decide upon client representation. By contrast, barristers in the UK have 
traditionally followed a "cab-rank" rule in which they are expected to take 
clients in the order in which they arrive at barristers' chambers. Empirical 
research, however, shows that this English rule is "widely thought to be 
honored mostly in the breach."58 
Professional rules of conduct in the US focus on those whom lawyers 
cannot represent, but the rules impose no conditions on client acceptance. 
Specifically, ABA Model Rule 1.16 prohibits lawyers from accepting a client if 
the representation would result in a violation of professional conduct rules, 
such as a lawyer's conflict of interest. Even if a court appoints an attorney to 
represent a client, the attorney can refuse the appointment if the client or the 
cause is "repugnant" to the lawyer.59 Moreover, once the client is accepted, 
57 Spaulding distinguishes between what he calls "thick" and "thin" professional identity and 
argues forcefully against the former, i.e., close identification of lawyers with their clients. 
See Norman W. Spaulding, "Reinterpreting professional identity," University of Colorado Law 
Review, 74 (zoo3), 1, 6. , 
58 W. Bradley Wendel, "Institutional and individual justification in legal ethics: the problem 
of client selection," Hofstra Law Review, 34 (zoo6), 987, 994· 
59 ABA Model Rule 6.2. (c). 
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a lawyer can still withdraw if he/she "considers [the client's objectives] repug-
nant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement."60 In short, 
other than avoiding conflicts of interest or clients who want to commit fraud, 
attorneys are generally free to reject clients for any reason whatsoever. 
Nevertheless, the question of whether lawyers may refuse to represent 
individuals based on race, ethnicity, religion, gender, or any other protected 
category - just as other private businesses are legally constrained - has been a 
controversial subject of debate for decades. The ABA and state bars have 
wrestled with how best to promote anti-discrimination within the legal profes-
sion - whether by the more general state anti-discrimination statutes or by 
ethical conduct rules specific to the legal profession. Although nearly all states 
have public accommodations statutes prohibiting discrimination, there is only 
one case on record applying such law to lawyers -a 2003 Massachusetts court 
decision against a feminist lawyer who refused to represent a man in a divorce 
action.61 Other states have professional conduct rules that prohibit discrimin-
ation }n the practice of law or within the profession, but these do not apply to 
client selection. In August 2016, this debate came to a head with a vote by the 
American Bar Association to add a new paragraph (g) to 8.4 'in the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct to explicitly prohibit lawyers from knowingly 
engaging in harassment or discrimination in the practice of law. However, 
following this statement of prohibition, 8.4(g) adds a qualification: "This 
paragraph does not limit the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw 
from a representation in accordance with Rule 1.16."6~ In other words, even 
with this controversial new rule change, it appears that attorneys continue to 
enjoy professional autonomy to accept or reject clients as they see fit. 
Commenting on this ethical gap in the rules, Professor Allen described the 
dilemma raised by a student in her Professional Responsibility class: "Wait a 
minute, are you telling me that after I graduate I could hang out a shingle that 
says, 'Lawyers for White People'?" Professor Allen acknowledged that numer-
ous websites already advertise gender-based legal services in family law - such 
as DAWN ("Divorce Attorneys for Women") or Family Law Attorneys for 
Men. 63 Allen argues in her comments to the ABA that the harm of the current 
ABA rule and the non-enforcement of most state anti-discrimination laws 
for client selection by lawyers greatly undermine the legitimacy of the legal 
6o ABA Model Rule 1.16 (b) (4). 
6
' Nathanson v. Mass. Commission against Discrimination, 16 Mass L. Rptr 761 (Mass. Sup. 
Ct. 2.003). 
6
' ABA Model Rule 8.4 (g). 
63 Jessie Allen, Comments to ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, March 
17, 2016, Re: Proposed Amendment to ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8+ 
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system. It is certainly ironic that one's access to legal rights and legal insti-
tutions depends on lawyers as gatekeepers choosing to grant such access, and 
yet the lawyers' own conduct in this process is largely unconstrained by law. 
CONCLUSION 
Lawyers express and reinforce dominant community values through their 
screening of potential clients. Engel's article alerted scholars to the import-
ance of this stage of the legal process, and, even more, to the nuance and 
complexity involved in the process of client selection. Although economic 
incentives for lawyers are the easiest to observe in screening decisions, when 
examined more closely by Engel and then by later researchers those incentives 
often turned out to rest on cultural assumptions - assumptions that are 
reinforced by social networks. Thus, the emphasis in "The OvenBird's Song" 
on the cultural values of residents and lawyers in Sander County to explain 
client acceptance was prescient. Moreover, Engel's lack of attention to formal 
law exerting constraints on lawyers remains accurate today, since lawyers are 
still largely unregulated in their selection of clients. 
Let me conclude by suggesting that these same factors that link the process 
of client selection to community values also point to how and why lawyers 
may occasionally help to bring about change. That is, by representing mar-
ginal voices in society, initiating new kinds of lawsuits, or making new legal 
arguments, lawyers select clients and present their cases in ways that may 
influence community values. The process of litigation requires, as Engel 
writes, that "norms and values that once patterned behavior unthinkingly 
or unconsciously must now be articulated, explained, and defended."64 For 
example, when a criminal lawyer defended her female client for killing her 
husband after years of his pqysical abuse, the lawyer introduced the wife, not 
the husband, as the victim, and thereby extended the concept of self-defense 
to include victims of domestic violence. In so doing, the lawyer asked the 
community to re-think its norms about violence within families, gender 
relations, and protections of criminal law. When a lawyer agreed to represent 
a gay client seeking a marriage certificate, he was challenging taken-for-
granted assumptions about the legal definition of marriage and forcing them 
to be "articulated, explained, and defended."65 As gay marriage cases made 
their way through the appellate courts, the traditional defense of marriage as a 
heterosexual institution broke down against constitutional claims of equal 
64 Engel, "The oven bird' s song," 579· 65 Ibid. 
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protection. Numerous other cases abound in which minority views within a 
local community (whether liberal or conservative voices) have found expres-
sion through litigation and ended up challenging community values and 
ultimately changing the law. 
Why do lawyers agree to represent clients against such overwhelming odds? 
For the same reasons that lawyers select clients based upon dominant com-
munity values. These lawyers may share the cultural ideas of their clients, 
perhaps seeing themselves as cause lawyers who use law to confront dominant 
norms. Or, the lawyers may have also experienced the marginal social status of 
their clients, whether due to gender, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, or 
something else within the social hierarchy of the legal profession. Or, the 
lawyers may be willing to take a risk with certain clients because they see 
possible economic benefits from representing them. For instance, my research 
a few decades ago revealed a small number of women divorce lawyers in New 
England who represented their clients - wives - in ways that challenged the 
status quo of small-town family law practice, which tended to favor husbands. 
These women lawyers embraced aggressive legal advocacy because of a com-
mitment to feminist principles (cultural values), their own marginalization by 
the largely male divorce bar (social network), and recognition of a market 
niche (economic incentive).66 Other examples abound in which lawyers 
marginalized within their own communities, such as lawyers from racial or 
ethnic minority backgrounds, represent their peers to reflect and confront 
wrongful treatment or to assert legal rights. While in some cases these practi-
tioners were part of organized political networks seeking legal change, others 
were simply individual lawyers who felt sidelined in their own communities 
because of their identities or values and sought to represent clients in order to 
remedy the situation. 
The study of lawyers as they decide whom to represent in litigation may 
seem at first blush to be an insignificant topic, but "The Oven Bird's Song" 
showed its importance for understanding the role lawyers play in mediating 
community values and law. Considerable scholarship since Engel's article has 
built on and extended his insights. The process of client selection shows how 
lawyers typically reflect, but on occasion may influence, community values. 
66 Mather et al., Divorce Lawyers at Work, p. 11.7. 
